Beauregard
Lost Shiloh Because of Hesitation
P.G.T.
Beauregard
Every
student of the Civil War has heard the story about how Confederate
General P.G.T. Beauregard blew the Southern victory at the Battle of
Shiloh. General Albert Sidney Johnston had worked so hard throughout
the day to win a desperately needed victory over Federal Major
General Ulysses Grant only to have the victory squandered by
Beauregard who stopped the action late in the day believing he would
finish up the Union army the next morning.
Each
time the story of Shiloh is brought up, one must endure this same
story repeatedly. Is this story fact or myth? It is true that Grant's
army was pushed all the way back to Pittsburg Landing overlooking the
Tennessee River. It is true that many of his men had become
demoralized and refused to fight. But in order to understand if
Beauregard blew the victory that afternoon, we must look at the
condition of the troops Grant had left and the condition of the
troops Beauregard had to continue the battle. One must also take a
look at the terrain Grant was defending and what Beauregard would
have to advance through to reach his position.
Once
Johnston was killed at Shiloh, many historians believe a lull fell
upon the field that gave the Federal's time to regroup at the
landing. The lull actually fell on the field as a result of the
capture of over two-thousand Union troops. These men were taken,
processed (weapons taken away), and then marched to the rear. Once
this was completed, the Confederate's had about one hour of daylight
remaining to deal with Grant. Brigadier General James R. Chalmers
infantry brigade was given a fresh supply of ammunition and ordered
forward. Brigadier General John K. Jackson's brigade was almost
depleted of ammo, thus they were sent forward with Chalmers and
instructed to rely upon the bayonet. Colonel Robert Trabue's brigade
was sent forward with their fellow Confederate's. Two of his
regiment's had newly captured Enfield rifles abandoned by the fleeing
Federal troops.
These
three brigades arrived at the ravine that contains Dill Branch about
6 p.m. For anyone who has walked through the terrain and up the steep
hill on the north side of Dill Branch (I am one of those who have),
it takes no great imagination to see the obstacle these weary men
who'd been fighting since daylight were facing. For anyone who has
worn Civil War era brogans on steep mossy ground (again I have), it's
extra treacherous.
Hill
overlooking Dill Branch
This
brings us to the next question of what were these men facing once
they actually struggled up that hill. At the top of this ridge,
Grant's chief of artillery, Colonel Joseph Webster had arrayed fifty
artillery pieces there to hold the last line. Chalmer's wrote about
the attempt by his brigade to carry Grant's last line, “In
attempting to storm the last ridge we were met by a fire from a whole
line of batteries protected by infantry and assisted by shells from
the gunboats. Our men struggled vainly to ascend the hill, which was
very steep, making charge after charge without success.” He went on
to report about a battery of Confederate artillery that was brought
forward to assist his men, “Gage's battery was brought up...but
suffered so severely that it was soon compelled to retire. This was
the sixth fight in which we had been engaged during the day, and my
men were too much exhausted to storm the batteries on the hill.”
Grant's
last line just above Dill Branch Ravine
Historian
James Lee McDonough stated, “Those who have criticized Beauregard
for ordering the army to fall back about six o'clock have shown
little understanding of the condition of the Rebel army or the
terrain they had to cross. He has been criticized for not consulting
the other commanders before withdrawing the army, but his decision
was the right one and was probably based, at least in part, on
intelligence of the total situation of his tired and exhausted troops
as supplied by his staff officers.”
This
was occurring after 6 p.m. What was happening on the Union side at
this time? A brigade of Buell's army had arrived across the Tennessee
River from Pittsburg Landing at 5 p.m. At 5:40, this brigade under
Colonel Jacob Ammen were crossing the river to reinforce Grant. Also,
Major General Lew Wallace's tardy division arrived on the field just
after dark.
Beauregard
wasn't wrong to call off the assault with what he had available to
move against Grant's position at this point. The Confederate army was
exhausted having fought all day and most units were low on
ammunition. Still, much of the Confederate army was seeing battle for
the first time and most units were down to half strength or less. The
victory had disorganized the Confederate's as badly as it had their
Union counterparts.
So
we're left with the question of who was actually at fault for the
loss of the Battle of Shiloh? Before entering the United States
Military Academy at West Point, Beauregard had attended a school
taught by two brothers who had served as lieutenants in Napoleon's
army. Beauregard who was already of French descent was further
enamored by the great French hero Napoleon.
Before
departing Corinth for the showdown with the Federal army at Shiloh,
Sidney Johnston, Beauregard's superior, wired President Davis in
Richmond that his plan of operations was to turn the Federal left
flank. In doing this, he would be required to place his strongest
corps on the right flank. He told Davis he would place Hardee's large
corps on the right, Bragg's corps in the middle, with Polk's weaker
corps on the left. The reserve corps under Breckinridge would be
placed behind Hardee's corps. What Johnston was attempting to do was
push Grant's army away from the river and its route of escape. He
wanted Grant's army pushed into the swamps northwest of Pittsburg
Landing where they would be forced to surrender.
Beauregard
arrived at Corinth recovering from throat surgery. Besides the throat
surgery he was suffering from a bronchial infection. Thus he had his
chief of staff Thomas Jordan draw up the battle plan. Jordan,
understanding Beauregard's love of Napoleon, used the only Napoleonic
battle plan he had in hand, the Battle of Waterloo. The plan called
for all four corps arrayed in line one behind the other, thus the
Confederate army of 40,000 men would strike the Federal army of
40,000 men one corps at a time. Basically, 10,000 men would strike
the 40,000 man Union army alone each time.
Beauregard's
alignment of the Confederate Army
Sidney
Johnston accepted Beauregard's plan without objecting to a single
thing. This was a fault that General Hardee had with General
Johnston. The man was so easy going that he lacked the ability to
override a strong-willed subordinate. Historian James Lee McDonough
stated, “Beauregard's...colossal ego...made him fully capable of
scrapping a superior's instructions and writing his own.”
The
resulting battle plan resulted in confusion and the many ranks
jumbled together. Each corps commander had a line almost three miles
long and with the terrain and forests at Shiloh, had no way of
controlling his entire corps. The result was a mass of men who
couldn't be watched over by their own commanders. Most of the
Confederate army being green troops with no combat experience made
matters even worse.
After
the war, President Davis was asked to speak in New Orleans at an
unveiling of a monument to Sidney Johnston. With Beauregard in
attendance, Davis said, “In the entire Shiloh Campaign, Johnston
made only one mistake, he let another officer direct the march to the
battlefield.” Davis was only close to being correct. Johnston
allowed Beauregard to plan the entire campaign and thus lose that
battle. The only difference in history and the myth we've been taught
today is the fact that Beauregard lost the Battle of Shiloh before
leaving Corinth, not the afternoon of the first day.
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